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Abstract
Volunteering can be interpreted as a process of search that matches volunteer labor supply
with demand for volunteer work by voluntary organizations like sports clubs. Using novel
data from an online questionnaire study of German sports club members, we constructed
a match quality index (MQI) that measures the outcome of this search process: the
congruence of motives for doing volunteer work and the utility experiences derived from
volunteer work. The MQI is higher on average for volunteers who would increase their
work effort if their sports club received additional public subsidies or other volunteers
would increase their work (crowding-in effect). The MQI is also higher on average for
volunteers who would increase their work effort if other volunteers would decrease their
work (crowding-out effect). Furthermore, match quality exhibits a positive correlation
with important outcomes of volunteering like volunteer satisfaction, labor supply, and
volunteers’ confidence that they meet the requirements of their volunteer positions. The
MQI is positively correlated with a bridging, but also with a bonding element of social
capital.
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1 Introduction
In a world of imperfect information volunteering can be viewed as a process of search (Schiff,
1980). This process has at least two aspects (Emrich & Pierdzioch, 2016). First, an individual
who plans to become a volunteer needs to gather information about whether a nonprofit
organization is a good match for his or her humanitarian or ideological values. A volunteer
may also collect information on the quality of the output of a nonprofit organization and the
efficiency with which it transforms volunteer inputs into output. Second, once a volunteer
has decided to work for a specific nonprofit organization a key issue is to gather information
about the work atmosphere between the paid staff and other volunteers. Importantly, a
volunteer needs to find out whether his or her volunteer work allows motives and environmental
affordance (Stukas, Worth, Clary, & Snyder, 2009) or motives and utility experiences (Emrich
& Pierdzioch, 2016) to be matched. Match quality, interpreted as the extent to which a
volunteer’s motives are fulfilled, is likely to influence various outcomes of volunteering like
satisfaction, involvement, and the willingness to continue volunteering (e.g., Tschirhart, Mesch,
Perry, Miller, & Lee, 2001). Researchers have, therefore, studied how match quality can
be measured, how it affects outcomes, and how it is linked to organizational structure and
socioeconomic variables (Davis, Hall, & Meyer, 2005; Stukas et al., 2009; Emrich & Pierdzioch,
2016).
For the management of a nonprofit organization, not only satisfaction, involvement, and the
willingness to continue volunteering is an important outcome of volunteering. Rather, it is
also crucial to understand whether and, if so, how volunteers would change their labor supply
when other volunteers would adjust their work effort or a nonprofit organization would receive
additional public subsidies. If volunteer labor supply would decrease (increase) in such a case
then the labor supply of volunteers, and volunteer labor supply and public funding, would be
substitutes (complements). At an operative level, managing a nonprofit organization would
be complicated if the labor supply of volunteers would move in tandem (complementarity)
rather than in opposite directions (substitutability). Studying the substitutability or com-
plementarity of volunteer labor supply is also important from the perspective of economic
theory. Economic theories of volunteer labor supply can be broadly categorized into public-
goods theories, private-consumption theories, and human-capital theories (see, e.g., Ziemek,
2006; Emrich & Pierdzioch, 2015).
Public-goods theories (Roberts, 1984; Bergstrom, Blume, & Varian, 1986; among others)
predict that a volunteer is only interested in the aggregate supply of a public good. Such
theories predict that, when other volunteers increase their labor supply or the state subsidizes
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a nonprofit organization, a volunteer decreases his or her labor supply to make sure that
the aggregate supply of the public good is unchanged (crowding-out effect). In contrast,
private-consumption theories (see, for example, Andreoni, 1989; Harbough, 1998) predict that
a volunteer derives in-process benefits from doing volunteer work (e.g., a ‘warm-glow’ feeling),
implying that state subsidies or changes in the labor supply of other volunteers do not affect
his or her labor-supply decision. Finally, human capital theories (e.g., Menchik & Weisbrod,
1987) predict that volunteers mainly aim at accumulating job-market skills and job-relevant
contacts. Because meeting other volunteers is easier in nonprofit organizations that employ
many volunteers, or simply because of signaling considerations, a volunteer should increase his
or her labor supply when other volunteers increase their work effort. Similarly, state subsidies
may increase the return on the volunteers’ time investment, resulting in a crowding-in effect
(for further discussion, see Ziemek, 2006).
Given their importance for discriminating between economic theories of volunteering, much
significant empirical work has been done to shed light on potential crowding-out and crowding-
in effects (for earlier studies, see Abrams & Schitz, 1978; Kingma, 1989; Steinberg, 1991;
Payne, 1998). In this strand of research, most researchers have studied the effect of government
subsidies on private donations of money to charitable and nonprofit organizations. Results of
this research are mixed with some researchers reporting results consistent with a crowding-out
effect and other researchers documenting evidence of a crowding-in effect (for a meta-analysis,
see De Wit & Bekkers, 2016). Evidence of a crowding-out effect has been reported by, for
example, Ribar and Wilhelm (2002), Simmons and Emanuele (2002), Ferris and West (2003),
Kim and Van Ryzin (2013), where the magnitude of the reported effect varies across studies.
Evidence of a crowding-in effect has been documented by Khanna and Sandler (2000), Smith
(2007), Heutel (2012), and Sokolowski (2013), among others. Crowding-in effects have also
been observed for sport clubs. Wicker, Breuer, and Hennings (2012) find that in German sport
clubs government subsidies crowd-in private subsidies. Still other researchers have emphasized
the possibility that the link between public subsidied and private donations is nonlinear, with
low (high) levels of public subsidies crowding in (out) private donations (Borgonovi, 2006;
Nikolova, 2015). Yet other researchers have emphasized that the sign of the effect of public
subsidies on private donations may differ across sectors (Brooks, 2000; De Wit, Bekkers, &
Groenou, 2016; Sokolowski, 2013) and across levels of government (that is, central government
versus multiple levels of government, see De Wit & Bekkers, 2016). Researchers also have
emphasized that donors are imperfectly informed about public subsidies (Horne, Johnson, &
Van Slyke, 2005) and that charitable organizations may offset public subsidies by reducing
fundraising efforts (Andreoni & Payne, 2003, 2011).
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Using novel data from an online questionnaire study of volunteers of German sports clubs, we
contribute to the debate on the crowding-out/crowding-in effect by studying the willingness of
volunteers to decrease or increase their labor supply when other volunteers would change their
work effort or the sports clubs would receive additional subsidies from the state. Studying
nonprofit sports clubs is interesting for several reasons. Nonprofit sports clubs are a quanti-
tatively important subgroup of nonprofit organizations, they are the main suppliers of sports
for broad groups of the population, and their grassroots work is indispensable for sighting
athletes for professional sport. Nonprofit sports clubs may create positive external effects that
contribute to the overall welfare of society, and they are a foundation of civil society not at
least because they heavily rely on the contributions of volunteers. Because volunteerism is
of key importance for nonprofit sports clubs it is of key interest to study whether volunteers
of nonprofit sports clubs view their contributions of time as substitutes or complements and
whether and, if so, how the substitutability or complementarity of volunteers’ labor supply
changes with variations in match quality.
Using volunteers’ answers to our questions concerning their utility experiences from volunteer-
ing and motives for doing volunteer work, we constructed a Match Quality Index (MQI) as in
Stukas et al. (2009) and Emrich and Pierdzioch (2016). We found that the MQI is higher on
average for volunteers who would increase their work effort if other volunteers would increase
their work effort or if their sports club would receive additional public subsidies. Further, we
found that the MQI is higher on average for volunteers who would increase their work effort if
other volunteers would decrease their work. These findings contribute in four important ways
to the relatively recent literature on volunteerism and match quality, on the one hand, and the
extensive literature on the crowding-out/crowding-in hypothesis, on the other hand. First, our
results shed light on how the work effort of other volunteers affects volunteers’ willingness to
expand or contract their own labor supply. Hence, we focus on volunteers’ donations of time
rather than donations of money, which have been the subject of much earlier research. Second,
we not only present results for public subsidies but also asked how volunteers would change
their labor supply if other volunteers who volunteer in the same sports club would change their
work effort. Third, our findings establish that match quality is systematically linked to an
important outcome of volunteering, namely the willingness of volunteers to change their labor
supply when others also do so. Fourth, our findings reveal an interesting asymmetry. Our
findings suggest that match quality reinforces a complementarity of volunteer labor supply
and, thus, a crowding-in effect is at work when others (including the state) would increase
their contributions. In contrast, match quality reinforces a substitutability of volunteer labor
supply consistent with a crowding-out effect in a scenario in which others would reduce their
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work effort.
Our findings also show that the MQI is correlated with several other important outcomes of
volunteering. In line with recent research on match quality, we found that volunteer satis-
faction and hours volunteered per week increase in match quality. Furthermore, the MQI is
positively correlated with volunteers confidence that they meet the requirements of a volunteer
position. Consistent with findings reported by Stukas, Daly, and Cowling (2005), we found
that the MQI is positively correlated with social capital as measured in terms of generalized
trust in others. At the same time, however, we found that the MQI is on average higher for
those volunteers who articulated that other members of their sports club are more trustworthy
than other members of society. Consistent with results reported by Behrens, Emrich, Meyer,
and Pierdzioch (2016), match quality thus seems to strengthen a bridging, but also a bonding
element of social capital.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we describe the instrument and data, In Section 3, we
summarize our empirical findings. In Section 4, we conclude.
2 The Instrument and the Data
2.1 Instrument
We collected the data used in this research by means of an online questionnaire study that we
conducted from May 29th to June 30th 2016. The link to the online questionnaire was sent
to registered volunteers in the database of Sportbund Pfalz e.V. (regional sports association
in Rhineland-Palatine, Germany). We asked volunteers several questions concerning their
volunteer work, their motives for doing volunteer work, their utility experiences, and their
sociodemographic status. Filling in the questionnaire consumed approximately 20−30 minutes
of time. In total, N = 3, 067 volunteers participated in the survey (but not all volunteers
answered all questions).
2.2 Match Quality Index
Table 1 summarizes the ten dimensions of volunteers’ motives and utility experiences that we
used to compute a match-quality index (MQI), where we had available data for N = 2, 307
volunteers. The ten dimensions cover altruistic motives and utility experiences correlated
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Table 1: Motive and Utility Dimensions Used to Construct the MQI
Dimension Motive Utility experience
(mean) (mean)
to gain attention within the club 1.78 3.65
to gain reputation and influence within the club 1.90 3.18
to defend one’s interests 2.63 3.01
to help others 4.19 4.04
to have fun 4.19 4.22
to spend leisure time in a worthwhile manner 3.55 3.76
to work together with other individuals 4.03 4.03
to improve job−market prospects 1.57 1.72
to bring about changes in politics 1.82 1.55
to contribute to small−scale developments in society 3.85 3.18
with the public-goods model, egoistic and consumption-oriented motives and utility experi-
ences that correspond to the private-consumption model, and job-market oriented motives
and utility experiences that represent the human-capital model.
We asked volunteers to rank separately every motive and every utility experience on a 5-point
scale from ‘do not agree’ to ‘totally agree’. Like Stukas et al. (2009) and Emrich and Pierdzioch
(2016), we then aggregated the information on the ten motives and utility experiences to a
total match-quality index (MQI) as follows:
MQIi =
10∑
j=1
motivei,j × utilityi,j ,
where the index i represents a volunteer, and the index j represents a motive/utility dimension.
Hence, for each volunteer a motive dimension and the corresponding utility dimension were
combined as multiplicative factors. We then summed up over all ten motive-utility dimensions
for which we had collected data to form a volunteer-specific MQI.
Match quality along a certain motive/utility dimension is high if both the motive and the utility
receive a high rank. Moreover, if both the motive and the utility receive a high rank than this
specific dimension is important for a volunteer, and so this dimension receives a high weight
in the construction of the MQI. The opposite is true for the case in which a motive dimension
and the corresponding utility dimension receive a low rank. In this case, even though match
quality is also high, a motive/utility dimension receives a small weight in the construction of
the MQI because it is unimportant for a volunteer. Finally, if there is a mismatch along a
certain dimension (e.g., a motive dimension receives a low rank whereas the corresponding
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Figure 1: Match-Quality Index (MQI)
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utility dimension receives a high rank), this dimension also receives a comparatively small
weight in the computation of the MQI.
Figure 1 plots the MQI. The MQI has a bell-shaped frequency distribution with a mean of
108.5 index points, a median of 106 index points, a standard deviation of 32.37 index points,
and min (max) of 10 (240) index points.
2.3 Outcomes of Volunteering and Social Capital
On average, a volunteer in our sample volunteers about seven hours per week (median = 5
hours per week, standard deviation approximately 6 hours per week, volunteers who answered
that they would work more than 40 hours per week were deleted from the sample). We asked
volunteers about the experiences they gained while volunteering in their sports club, and we
asked social-capital questions. Volunteers could answer on a 5-point scale (results are for those
volunteers for which we have data on the MQI).
Table 2 summarizes descriptive statistics of personal experiences of an individual’s voluntary
work. For more than 77% of the participants the volunteer work in their sports club is an
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Table 2: Outcomes of Volunteering
Questions/Statements Answers Percentages
How important is your volunteer work to you? Very important 23.42
Important 53.77
So, so 19.08
Less important 3.29
Unimportant 0.44
Are you up to the challenges of your voluntary work? Always 28.24
Most of the time 70.16
Sometimes 1.26
Seldom 0.26
Never 0.09
How content are you with your volunteer work? Very content 20.85
Content 57.43
So, so 19.26
Discontent 1.86
Very Discontent 0.59
How content are you with your club’s support? Very content 18.01
Content 51.53
Partly content 21.63
Discontent 4.42
Very discontent 4.42
important or very important part of live. Only less than 4% answered that volunteering is
less important or unimportant to them. Regarding the tasks and challenges of their volunteer
work, most participants are quite confident. Only 1.61% of the volunteers said they were
sometimes, seldom, or never up to the challenges of their volunteer work, whereas 70.16% are
most of the time and 28.24% are always up to the task. When asked about the satisfaction with
their volunteer work most volunteers claim to be content (57.43%) or very content (20.85%)
and only 2.45% are either discontent or very discontent.
When asked about the satisfaction with their club’s support, almost 9% of volunteers answered
that they were at least discontent, while 51.53% answered that they were content with their
club’s support and 18.01% are very content. The interpretation of these descriptive statistics,
however, should not be stretched too far as they most likely reflect at least to some extent
a selection bias because volunteers who are very discontent with their voluntary work or the
situation in their sports club presumably terminated volunteering for that sports club and,
thus, do not show up in our sample.
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Table 3: Social Capital
Questions/Statements Answers Percentages
The sense of community in our club is declining. Fully disagree 14.01
Mostly disagree 16.36
So, so 38.83
Mostly agree 19.23
Fully agree 11.57
I generally trust others. Fully disagree 1.08
Mostly disagree 5.59
So, so 32.88
Mostly agree 42.41
Fully agree 18.04
I generally trust members of my club more than others. Fully disagree 30.57
Mostly disagree 13.66
So, so 32.74
Mostly agree 17.66
Fully agree 5.37
Table 3 summarizes results for social capital. Regarding the sense of community in a volun-
teer’s sports club the answers are quite evenly distributed. Most participants neither agree
(nor disagree) that the sense of community in their sports club is declining (38.83%). 30.37%
mostly or fully disagree with that statement, whereas 30.8% mostly or fully agree with it.
Concerning general trust in others, 42.41% of the volunteers mostly agree and 18.04% fully
agree with the statement ‘I generally trust others’. Only 6.67% disagree at least partly and
32.88% neither agree nor disagree. When asked in how far they agree with the statement ‘I
generally trust members of my club more than others’, 44.23% of volunteers mostly or fully
disagree, 32.74% neither agree nor disagree, and 23.03% at least partly agree.
2.4 Crowding Out and Crowding In
In order to study the crowding-out/crowding-in hypothesis, we asked volunteers what they
would do if other volunteers of their sports club would expand labor supply by one hour per
week. Volunteers could answer on a 7-point scale from ‘I would decrease my labor supply by
more than one hour’ to ‘I would increase my labor supply by more than one hour’. We asked
whether they would expand labor supply by more or less than one hour because the strength
of a crowding-out/crowding-in effect has been studied in earlier research.
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Table 4: Crowding-Out/Crowding-In Questions
Answers Percentages
Panel A
Other volunteers increase their labor supply by one hour per week.
How would you adapt your labor supply?
1 No - Reduction by more than one hour 2.40
2 No - Reduction by one hour 1.75
3 No - Reduction by less than one hour 0.92
4 No - Unchanged 62.08
5 Yes - Increase by less than one hour 3.51
6 Yes - Increase by one hour 16.19
7 Yes - Increase by more than one hour 13.15
Panel B
Other volunteers reduce their labor supply.
How would you adapt your labor supply?
1 I compensate the reduction by working more 47.16
2 I do not care 49.27
3 I also reduce my working time 3.57
Panel C
Your club receives larger government subsidies.
Would you adapt your labor supply?
1 Yes - Increase 30.32
2 No - Unchanged 68.58
3 No - Reduce 1.10
Panel A of Table 4 shows the distribution of answers (results are for those volunteers for which
we have data on the MQI). The majority of about 62% of volunteers answered that they would
not alter their labor supply if other volunteers would increase labor supply. Approximately
33% would increase their labor supply, and 5% answered that they would reduce their labor
supply.
Panel B summarizes descriptive statistics for the question how a volunteer would change his
or her labor supply if other volunteers of the sports club would decrease their labor supply.
Volunteers could choose among the three categories ‘I would compensate’, ‘I do not care’,
and ‘I reduce my volunteer work’. In total, 47% of volunteers answered that they would
compensate the reduction of work effort by others, and 49% answered that they do not care
what other volunteers do.
Panel C shows summary statistics for the question how a volunteer would change his or her
labor supply if the sports club would receive additional public subsidies. The results show
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that 68% of volunteers answered that an increase in public subsidies would not affect their
labor supply, while 30% answered that they would expand their labor supply.
Summing up, the descriptive statistics show evidence of a dominating crowding-in effect in
the case of public subsidies and in case that other volunteers increase their work effort. This
crowding-in effect is consistent with the view that public subsidies and volunteer labor supply,
and the labor supply of different volunteers, are complements. Such a complementarity is con-
sistent with human-capital theories of volunteer labor supply. There is also evidence, however,
that a non-negligible proportion of volunteers does not alter labor supply in response to public
subsidies and/or an increase in the volunteer labor supply of others. Such an invariance is
consistent with private-consumption theories of volunteer labor supply. Finally, the observed
large proportion of volunteers who would increase their labor supply in response to a reduction
of work effort by other volunteers is consistent with the view that there is a substitutability of
labor supply of different volunteers, which is consistent with public-goods theories of volunteer
labor supply. Hence, all three categories of economic theories of volunteer labor supply help
to explain different facets of the data. In addition, the descriptive statistics show the presence
of an asymmetry insofar as it seems to matter for the complementarity/substitutability of
volunteer labor supply whether other volunteers increase or decrease their work effort.
3 Empirical Results
3.1 MQI, Outcomes, and Social Capital
Table 5 shows the MQI as a function of the outcomes of volunteering. Panel A summarizes the
results for outcomes of volunteering. The MQI is higher for those volunteers who answered
that volunteering in their sports club is an important part of their life, who are often up to
the challenges of their volunteer work, and who are content with their volunteer work and the
support they receive from their sports club. Hence, match quality is positively correlated with
outcomes of volunteering, a result that is consistent with findings reported in earlier research
(Emrich & Pierdzioch, 2016). We also found a positive correlation between the MQI and (log)
hours volunteered per week. The correlation is 0.16, where the 95% confidence interval ranges
from 0.12 to 0.20 (t = 7.77, p-value < 0.01).
The results summarized in Table 6 on the correlation between the MQI and measures of social
capital are also consistent with findings documented in earlier literature. The results show
that the MQI is higher on average for those volunteers who disagree with the statement that
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Table 5: MQI and Outcomes of Volunteering
Questions/Statements Answers MQI (mean)
How important is your volunteer work to you? Very important 128.55
Important 109.31
So, so 89.65
Less important 77.87
Unimportant 51.20
Are you up to the challenges of your voluntary work? Always 110.99
Most of the time 107.97
Sometimes 96.72
Seldom 85.17
Never 33.00
How content are you with your volunteer work? Very content 124.35
Content 108.08
So, so 96.60
Discontent 83.27
Very Discontent 64.15
How content are you with your club’s support? Very content 122.78
Content 108.64
Partly content 100.68
Discontent 102.31
Very discontent 111.13
the sense of community in their sports club is declining. Consistent with findings reported
by Stukas et al. (2005), match quality is higher for those volunteers who answered that they
generally trust others. Interestingly, however, the MQI is also higher for those volunteers
who agreed that they generally trust members of their sports club more than others. Match
quality, thus, is positively correlated with a binding but also with a bonding component of
social capital (Behrens et al., 2016).
When we compared the averages of the MQI for the ‘fully agree’ categories with the averages
we obtained for the ‘fully disagree’ categories we obtained statistically highly significant results
(sense of community: t = 7.09, p-value < 0.01; general trust: t = -2.68, df = 24.19, p-value
= 0.01; trust members of my club more than others: t = -8.17, p-value < 0.01).
3.2 Match Quality and Crowding Out/In
Table 7 shows the MQI for the categories of the crowding-out/crowding-in questions. The
MQI is higher on average for those volunteers who would increase their labor supply when
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Table 6: MQI and Social Capital
Questions/Statements Answers MQI (mean)
The sense of community in our club is declining. Fully disagree 118.92
Mostly disagree 111.31
So, so 108.34
Mostly agree 105.14
Fully agree 98.21
I generally trust others. Fully disagree 95.21
Mostly disagree 103.46
So, so 104.06
Mostly agree 109.07
Fully agree 116.91
I generally trust members of my club more than others. Fully disagree 102.84
Mostly disagree 103.21
So, so 108.36
Mostly agree 115.39
Fully agree 129.37
others also increase their labor supply. The MQI is also higher for those volunteers who would
compensate a reduction of labor supply by other volunteers. Furthermore, the MQI is higher
for those volunteers who would increase their labor supply if their sports club would receive
additional government subsidies. Hence, our results recover an interesting asymmetry. Our
findings imply that a complementarity of volunteer labor supply and, thus, a crowding-in effect
is at work when others (including the state) would increase their contributions. At the same
time, however, a substitutability of volunteer labor supply consistent with a crowding-out
effect appears is at work when others would reduce their work effort.
Because we have few observations for some of the categories of the crowding-out/crowding-in
questions, we tested the statistical significance of the differences between the average MQIs
by forming two categories for every crowding-out/crowding-in question. With regard to the
question how a volunteer would change his or her labor supply when others increase their
labor supply by one hour per week, we formed the categories ‘would not increase labor supply’
and ‘would increase labor supply’. The difference between the average MQIs for these two
categories turned out to be statistically highly significant (t = -6.86, p.value < 0.01). Simi-
larly, we formed the two categories ‘do not care or reduce labor supply’ and ‘compensate the
reduction by increasing their labor supply’ for the question ‘What would you do when other
volunteers reduce their labor supply?’. Again, the difference between the average MQIs for
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Table 7: MQI and the Crowding-Out/Crowding-In Hypotheses
Answers MQI (mean)
Panel A
Other volunteers increase their labor supply by one hour per week.
How would you adapt your labor supply?
1 No - Reduction by more than one hour 92.81
2 No - Reduction by one hour 110.58
3 No - Reduction by less than one hour 105.85
4 No - Unchanged 105.46
5 Yes - Increase by less than one hour 112.46
6 Yes - Increase by one hour 116.17
7 Yes - Increase by more than one hour 115.12
Panel B
Other volunteers reduce their labor supply.
How would you adapt your labor supply?
1 I compensate the reduction by working more 113.50
2 I do not care 104.71
3 I also reduce my working time 99.82
Panel C
Your club receives larger government subsidies.
Would you adapt your labor supply?
1 Yes - Increase 115.02
2 No - Unchanged 105.93
3 No - Reduce 94.38
these two categories was significant (t = -6.56, p-value < 0.01). As for the question what a
volunteer would do if the sports club received additional public subsidies we formed the two
categories ‘unchanged or reduce’ and ‘increase’ labor supply and found that the average MQI
is significantly smaller in the former category than in the latter (t = -6.13, p-value < 0.01).
3.3 Regression Model
The answers given by volunteers to the crowding-in/crowding-out questions most likely do
not only depend upon match quality alone. For example, the willingness to expand labor
supply in case other volunteers shrink their work effort may not only depend on the MQI
but also on how important volunteer work is for a volunteer and how satisfied he or she is
with their volunteer work. Rather, it is important to study the partial correlation of the MQI
with the answers to the crowding-in/crowding-out questions, that is, the effects that obtain
after accounting for the interfering effects of other potentially influential sociodemographic
13
Table 8: Regression Model
Crowding-out/crowding-in question MQI t-value N
1 Other volunteers increase their labor supply. 0.0073 3.6207 1251
2 Other volunteers reduce their labor supply. -0.0027 -1.3251 1239
3 Your club receives larger government subsidies. -0.0048 -2.1809 1257
Control variables: importance of volunteering, satisfaction, shortage of volunteers
in the sports club, reliogiosity, interest in politics, financial situation, children.
variables. For this reason, we estimated a multivariate regression model. In addition to match
quality, we included several sociodemographic control variables in the model.
In order to proxy for time constraints imposed by a a volunteer’s family life we asked whether
a volunteer has children. We also controlled for a volunteer’s overall financial situation (5-
point scale from ‘poor’ to ‘very good’) because the answers to the crowding-in/crowding-out
questions may depend on whether a volunteer can afford expanding his or her labor supply. We
also controlled for a volunteer’s general humanitarian values by including data on religiosity
and interest in politics (both measured using a 5-point scale from ‘not at all’ to ‘very strong’)
in the regression model. Finally, we asked volunteers whether there is a general shortage of
volunteers in their sports club (coded as a binary variable; ‘yes’ or ‘no’), and we added the
answers to the questions how important is volunteering and how content are volunteers with
their work to the list of control variables.
Because of the ordered structure of the answer categories for the crowding-in/crowding-out
questions, we estimated the regression model in the form of an ordered probit model. The
results summarized in Table 8 show that match quality is significantly correlated with the
responses of the crowding-in/crowding-out questions even after accounting for the influence
of the sociodemographic control variables. Further inspection of the marginal effects showed
that match quality shifts probability to the complementarity (substitutionality) categories
in case others increase their volunteer labor or the sports club receives additional public
subsidies (others reduce their volunteer labor supply), corroborating the results of the bivariate
correlation analyses.
4 Concluding Remarks
Based on data from an online questionnaire study of volunteers of German sports clubs, we
studied how outcomes of volunteering, social capital, and volunteers towards a crowding-
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in/crowding-out effect are correlated with match quality. We measured match quality by
means of an index that aggregates the congruence of a volunteer’s motives for doing volunteer
work with utility experiences from volunteer work along several motive/utility dimensions.
The match quality index is positively correlated with various outcomes of volunteering and
with measures of social capital. However, while match quality appears to be positively corre-
lated with the bridging component of social capital, we also found evidence that match quality
reinforces the bonding component of social capital. While we measured the former in terms
of a volunteer’s general trust in others, we measured the latter by asking volunteers whether
they trust members of their sports club more than other members of society.
We further found that match quality is on average higher for volunteers who would increase
their labor supply if other volunteers of their sports club would increase their work effort. In
this case, match quality is positively associated with a complementarity of volunteer labor
supply and a crowding-in effect. Similarly, we found that match quality is higher for those
volunteers who would expand their labor supply in case their sports club would receive addi-
tional public subsidies. In contrast, we also found that match quality is higher for volunteers
who would compensate a reduction in labor supply by other volunteers. In this case, match
quality appears to strengthen a substitutionality of volunteer labor supply and a crowding-out
effect.
One interpretation of our complementarity/substitutionality result is that volunteer prefer-
ences depend on the social setting. In this context, Bosworth, Singer, and Snower (2016)
introduce a model in which responsive agents adjust to changing social environments. Con-
sistent with our approach to measuring match quality, they argue that individuals exhibit
multiple discrete motives. Different motives can be activated in different social settings. Ap-
plied to our research, it seems that the information that other volunteers increase their working
time or the state increases a club’s funding activates egoistic motives. If volunteers were in-
terested in the total supply of a club good, as stipulated by models of the public-goods type,
they would simply decrease their labor supply in such a social environment. However, once
the social setting changes, i.e., other volunteers decrease their working hours and the club’s
public good production threatens to decline, volunteers with a high match quality step up in
order to sustain production of the club’s public good. Hence, these volunteers experience a
shift towards altruistic preferences in the sense assumed in public-goods models.
15
References
Abrams, B.A., & Schitz, M.D. (1978). The ’crowding−out’ effect of governmental transfers
on private charitable contributions. Public Choice, 33, 29−39.
Andreoni, J. (1989). Giving with impure altruism: Applications to charity and Ricardian
equivalence. Journal of Political Economy, 97, 1447−1458.
Andreoni, J. (1990). Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory of warm-glow
giving. Economic Journal, 100, 464−477.
Andreoni, J., & Payne, A.A. (2003). Do government grants to private charities crowd out
giving or fund−raising? American Economic Review, 93, 792−812.
Andreoni, J., & Payne, A.A. (2011). Is crowding out due entirely to fundraising? evidence
from a panel of charities. Journal of Public Economics, 95, 334−343.
Behrens, C., Emrich, E., Meyer, T. & Pierdzioch, C. (2016). Football clubs and philanthropy:
An empirical analysis of volunteering, match quality, and donations. International Re-
view for the Sociology of Sport. Advance online publication. doi: 10.1177/1012690216672653.
Bergstrom, T., Blume, L., & Varian, H. (1986). On the private provision of public goods.
Journal of Public Economics, 29, 25−49.
Borgonovi, F. (2006). Do public grants to American theatres crowd−out private donations?
Public Choice, 126, 429−451.
Bosworth, S.J., Singer, T., & Snower, D.J. (2016). Cooperation, motivation and social
balance. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 126, 72−94.
Brooks, A.C. (2000). Public subsidies and charitable giving: Crowding out, crowding in, or
both? Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 19, 451−464.
Davis, M.H., Hall, J.J., & Meyer, M. (2005). The first year: Influences on the satisfaction,
involvement, and persistence of new community volunteers. Personality and Psychology
Bulletin, 29, 248−260.
De Wit, A., & Bekkers, R. (2016). Government support and charitable donations: A
meta−analysis of the crowding−out hypothesis. Journal of Public Administration Re-
search and Theory. Advance online publication. doi: 10.1093/jopart/muw044.
16
De Wit, A., Bekkers, R., & van Groenou, M.B. (2016). Heterogeneity in crowding−out:
When are charitable donations responsive to government support? European Sociological
Review, 33, 59−71.
Emrich, E., & Pierdzioch, C. (2015). Testing economic models of volunteer labor supply:
Some empirical evidence for the German Red Cross. Applied Economics, 47, 4247−4259.
Emrich, E., & Pierdzioch, C. (2016). Volunteering, match quality, and internet use. Schmollers
Jahrbuch, 136, 199−226.
Ferris J.S., & West, E.G. (2003). Private versus public charity: Reassessing crowding out
from the supply side. Public Choice, 116, 399−417.
Harbaugh, W.T. (1998). What do donations buy? A model of philanthropy based on prestige
and warm glow. Journal of Public Economics, 67, 269−284.
Heutel, G. (2014). Crowding out and crowding in of private donations and government
grants. Public Finance Review, 42, 143−175.
Horne, C., Johnson, J.L., & van Slyke, D.M. (2005). Do charitable donors know enough
− and care enough − about government subsidies to affect private giving to nonprofit
organizations? Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 34, 136−149.
Khanna, J., & Sandler, T. (2000). Partners in giving: The crowding−in effects of UK
government grants. European Economic Review, 44, 1543−1556.
Kim, M., & van Ryzin, G.G. (2014). Impact of government funding on donations to arts
organizations: A survey experiment. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 43,
910−925.
Kingma, B.R. (1989). An accurate measurement of the crowd−out effect, income effect, and
price effect for charitable contributions. Journal of Political Economy, 97, 1197−1207.
Menchink, P.L., & Weisbrod, B.A. (1987). Volunteer labour supply. Journal of Public
Economics, 32, 159−183.
Nikolova, M. (2015). Government funding of private voluntary organizations: Is there a
crowding−out effect? Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 44, 487−509.
Payne, A.A. (1998). Does the government crowd−out private donations? New evidence from
a sample of non−profit firms. Journal of Public Economics, 69, 323−345.
17
R Core Team (2015). R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing. R Foun-
dation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. http://www.R-project.org/.
Ribar, D.C., &Wilhelm, M.O. (2002). Altruistic and joy−of−giving motivations in charitable
behavior. Journal of Political Economy, 110, 425−457.
Roberts, R.D. (1984). A positive model of private charity and public transfers. Journal of
Political Economy, 92, 136−148.
Schiff, G. (1980). Charitable giving and government policy: An economic analysis. Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press.
Simmons, W.O, & Emanuele, R. (2004). Does government spending crowd out donations of
time and money? Public Finance Review, 32, 498−511.
Smith, T.M. (2007). The impact of government funding on private contributions to non-
profit performing arts organizations. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 78,
137−160.
Sokolowski, S.W. (2013). Effects of government support of nonprofit institutions on aggregate
private philanthropy: Evidence from 40 countries. Voluntas, 24, 359−381.
Steinberg, R. (1991). Does government spending crowd out donations? Interpreting the
evidence. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 64, 591−612.
Stukas, A.A., Daly, M., & Cowling, M.J. (2005). Volunteerism and social capital: A func-
tional approach. Australian Journal on Volunteering, 10, 35−44.
Stukas, A.A., Worth, K.A., Clary, E.G., & Snyder, M. (2009). The matching of motivations
to affordances in the volunteer environment − An index for assessing the impact of
multiple matches on volunteer outcomes. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 38,
5−28.
Tschirhart, M., Mesch, D.J., Perry, J.L., Miller, T.K., & Lee, G. (2001). Stipended volun-
teers: Their goals, experiences, satisfaction and likelihood of future service. Nonprofit
and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 30, 422−443.
Wicker, P., Breuer, C., & Hennings, B. (2012). Understanding the interactions among rev-
enue categories using elasticity measures − evidence from a longitudal sample of non-
profit sport clubs in Germany. Sport Management Review, 15, 318−329.
18
Ziemek, S. (2006). Economic analysis of volunteers’ motivations − A cross-country study.
Journal of Socio-Economics, 35, 532−555.
19
